Within the context of the American justice system, the idea of Standard of Proof possesses special importance.  Referring to the level of proof necessary for a prosecution to fulfil its burden of proof obligation, it supplies the guidelines for the determination of guilt/innocence in both civil and criminal law circumstances.  Two of the three standards of proof, “preponderance of evidence” and “clear and convincing evidence” are limited in use to civil case.  This is largely because they need only a low to medium level of proof for the establishment of guilt.  As regards the third standard, “beyond reasonably doubt,” it is primarily employed in criminal instances and calls for a very high level of proof.  Indeed, unlike the 1st two standards where the prosecution is only called upon to establish the greater likelihood of guilt than innocence, this standard maintains that a locating of guilt can not be created unless the aforementioned has been established beyond all reasonable doubt.  Having clarified the aforementioned, this essay will now proceed to talk about the said standards in greater detail, offering a a lot more precise clarification of the distinctions between them, their uses and rationale.

As earlier noted, there are two levels of proof within the context of the American justice system, with one of these being “preponderance of evidence.” As explained by a number of legal scholars and researchers, this last constitutes the lowest level of standard of proof and, accordingly, is only applicable to civil instances.  In further elaboration upon the aforementioned, Tapper (2004) notes that “preponderance of evidence” successfully refers to the presence of reasonable suspicion, rather than firm suspicion.  In other words, preponderance of evidence implies that there could be sufficient evidence to support reasonable suspicion but hardly enough to confirm suspicion.  For purposes of further clarification of the implications of the stated, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) emerges as very informative.  In this case the court discovered that as preponderance of evidence was a low regular of proof, search warrants issued on that basis should have a limited level of intrusiveness.  The reason, as Tapper (2004) fairly clear explains is that as a standard of proof, preponderance of evidence suggests that an infringement of the law could have taken place or may well be underway but hardly enables for the determination of the stated.  Accordingly, the limitation of the intrusiveness of search warrants issued on its basis is a concession to the inviolability of the civil rights and liberties of citizens or foreign residents.

In direct comparison to the concept of “preponderance of evidence,” “clear and convincing evidence” refers to a higher regular of proof.  According to Tapper it is a “median” standard of proof, lying midway between the low level certain to “preponderance of evidence,” and the uncompromisingly high level specific to “beyond all reasonable doubt.” Inside the context of the stated, it is very best defined as an intermediate level of burden of proof and, accordingly, as with “preponderance of evidence,” its use is confined to civil procedures and is excluded from criminal court cases.  The rationale behind the stated emerges from the fact that “clear and convincing evidence” demands, as Clermont and Sherwill (2002) explain, the establishment of a greater likelihood of culpability than lack thereof.  This means that the party upon whom the burden of proof rests is required to persuade the trier of reality of the greater likelihood of truth than of falsity.  Within the context of the stated, the said party does not want to establish guilt beyond all reasonable doubt but, instead, has to establish that the matter which is being argued is more likely to be true than not.

As earlier noted, both standards of proof outlined in the preceding are primarily utilized in civil law instances and never, at least within the context of the American Justice Method, criminal law cases.  The reason, as evidenced in the foregoing explanations, is that within the criminal justice method, the establishment of guilt is a lot more likely than not to be succeeded by sentencing which places severe and temporarily, possibly, permanently irrevocable constraints on a person’s inherent appropriate to freedom.  Indeed, in some states and as pertains to certain sorts of crimes, the establishment of guilt can quite properly lead to the loss of life by way of the imposition of a capital punishment sentence (Tapper, 2004).  Given the stated, it is neither in the interest of justice or faireness that defendants confront the possibility of the said consequences on the basis of either reasonable levels of suspicion or a greater likelihood of guilt than innocence.  It is precisely simply because of the consequences of the establishment of guilt inside criminal law that the use of both of the standards of proof discussed in the foregoing is confined to civil law cases.

Within the context of criminal instances and as influenced by the Constitution, a defendant can only be discovered guilty if the prosecution has established guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.  As the court stated in Winship 397 US 358 (1970)the legal proposition that criminal defendants might be convicted only on proof beyond reasonable doubt is a factor in every criminal case in the United States “it plays a vital role in the scheme of American procedure.”  The reasonable doubt rule permits for an interplay between the dictates of the law in the criminal justice program and the values and concerns that ordinary citizens bring to the choice-generating method within that program.  From within this perspective, the reasonable doubt rule serves to guarantee that the decision of jurors, of ordinary citizens, is predicated on facts and evidences which have been established beyond doubt, rather than on subjective evaluations or prejudicial, possibly wholly unreasonable, assumptions (Patterson, 2005).

Proceeding from the above stated, it is critical to emphasise, as does Patterson (2005), that criminal law has an obligation to supply courts, both judges and jurors, with guidance concerning determination of guilt in criminal circumstances.  This specific regular of proof is that guidance and the framework it delivers for deliberation and subsequent determination of the defendant’s guilt, is whether or not the prosecution has presented evidence and argued the facts of his case in such a way that the court could arrive at a obtaining of guilty without having there becoming any reasonable doubt regarding possible innocence (Patterson, 2005).

In further clarification of the beyond reasonable doubt standard, Bobbitt (1991) contends that an accurate comprehension of the proposition that a defendant may possibly be convicted only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt extends beyond defining this standard of proof.  Instead, understanding the implications of this standard entails an understanding of the operation of the criminal justice method, particularly the criminal trial.  It entails an understanding of the reality that the inherent proper to life,  liberty and freedom enshrined in the constitution means that the law can’t transgress upon any of a citizen or resident foreigner’s rights to the stated without their being constitutional and legal grounds for performing so.  The constitutional and legal grounds which legitimize the stated are irrevocably tied to the defendant’s having committed a criminal act.   Added to that and given that there is an assumption of innocence, the proof of burden falls upon the prosecution and it is the prosecution who must convince the jurors that the defendant’s  guilt is unquestionable and not the responsibility of the defendant to prove his innocence.  As might be surmised, therefore, the standard is high simply because guilt limits a citizen’s otherwise inherent constitutional rights.

As could have been determined from the foregoing discussion, the distinction between the 3 standards of proof are rationalised by the reality that they are employed within various judicial context.  The initial two, which need low levels of proof, are confined in use to civil cases.  The third, which constitutes the standard for the determination of criminal culpability, requires  a extremely high level of proof.  The rationale behind the stated lies in that guilt in criminal cases could lead to the imposition of limitations upon the defendant’s constitutional rights, such as his correct to freedom or life.  Accordingly, just before the imposition of such constraints/limitations, it is imperative that guilt be established beyond all reasonable doubt.


References

Bobbit, P. (1991)  Constitutional Interpretation.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clermont, K.M. and Sherwin, E. (2002)  A comparative view of standards of proof.  American Journal of Comparative Law, 50(243).

Patterson, D.M. (2005) Law and Truth.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tapper, C. (2004) Cross and Tapper on Evidence.  New York: Butterworth.

 

 

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